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THE INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE




University of St. Thomas
A survey of 1,329 of the largest corporations m the United States reveals that the
average annual cost of compliance with federal and subfederal corporation
income taxes is approximately $1.565 million, implying an aggregate annual com-
pliance cost of over $2 billion. As a fraction of revenue raised, these compliance
costs are lower than estimates that have been made for the individual income tax.
The cost-to-revenue ratio is higher for state corporate tax systems than it is for the
federal tax system, presumably reflecting the nonuniformity of state tax systems
There is near unanimity among senior corporate tax officers that the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 added complexity to the tax system, resulting in a combination of higher
compliance costs and less accurate information transmission. They point to, in
particular, the alternative minimum tax, inventory capitalization rules, and the taxation
of foreign-source income as growing sources of complexity.
One of the costs of operating a tax system is the compliance
cost imposed on the taxpayers themselves. Previous research
on the individual income tax suggests that the compliance cost is many
times higher than the budget of the tax administration agency; recent
estimates have put the annual compliance cost of the federal and
subfederal individual income taxes as high as $35 billion, compared
to a total Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget of about $6 billion
(Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992).
Although compliance costs are large, reducing these costs through
simplifying the tax process has seldom been an important objective of
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tax policy. One reason for its lack of prominence is that it has no natural
constituency. Another possible reason is the scarcity of hard evidence
about the compliance cost of alternative tax policies or about how large
the total cost of complexity is. An inevitable result of the low priority
given to tax simplicity is a trend toward more complexity. A notable
example of this is the business tax provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Whatever else its merits, there is near unanimity that the Act
represented a substantial increase in the complexity of the tax system.
This article presents evidence from a survey of large corporations
in the United States concerning their cost of complying with federal
and subfederal income taxes. It attempts to measure both the overall
size and composition of these costs and also to investigate what about
a firm and its tax situation determines its compliance cost. It also
reports on the attitudes and tax reform suggestions of corporate tax
officers. The goal of the project is to provide quantitative evidence
about compliance costs that can form the basis for future tax policy
initiatives that simplify the income tax system without compromising
its other objectives.
SURVEY DESIGN AND EXECUTION
DESIGN
The first step in the process was to draft a pilot survey. In this
process, we drew on the expertise of an advisory panel consisting of
corporate tax officers organized by the Tax Foundation and repre-
sentatives of the IRS Coordinated Examination Program. We also
profited from studying the survey instruments used by Sandford,
Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) in their study of the United Kingdom
and that used by Pope, Fayle, and Chen (1991) in their study of
Australia. Several of the advisory panel members then gave the pilot
instrument a trial run within their own firms. Comments and sugges-
tions from the pilot survey experience were incorporated into the final
version of the survey.
The final survey instrument was 12 pages long and divided into five
parts.’ The first part asked about general characteristics of the com-
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pany’s tax affairs, sector, measures of firm size, and the extent of
foreign operations. Parts 2 and 3 asked about the cost of complying
with the income tax law. Costs were to be divided into several
categories: whether due to federal or state and local income taxation,
whether costs were incurred in-house or paid to those providing
outside assistance, whether in-house costs were within or outside the
tax department, whether they were personnel or nonpersonnel costs,
and how they broke down by function (record keeping, planning,
return filing, etc.). Part 4 included several questions evaluating the
firm’s interactions with the Internal Revenue Service, including rat-
ings of each member of the audit team and of overall satisfaction. The
concluding section was primarily devoted to open-ended questions
about the sources of complexity in the tax code, suggestions for
simplifying the tax system, and corporate strategies for coping with
increased complexity.
The survey was accompanied by a cover letter from the two authors,
on University of Michigan letterhead, explaining the objectives of the
project and identifying the sponsors. It also promised that all individ-
ual firm information would be kept confidential and only summary
results would be reported.
The cover letter emphasized that the survey questions referred only
to the compliance costs of U.S. federal, state, and local income taxes
and not to the costs of complying with payroll, property, excise,
withholding, and other taxes. The survey did, though, cover the
expenditures incurred by foreign affiliates in complying with U.S. tax
laws, though not with foreign tax laws. Finally, the letter stated that
the survey was trying to measure &dquo;the annual incremental cost imposed
by income tax compliance, i.e., what [you] could save over the long
run if these taxes were eliminated.&dquo;
EXECUTION
Between June 9 and 15, 1992, the survey was mailed to the chief
corporate tax officer at the 1,672 firms in the Coordinated Examination
Program (CEP) of the Internal Revenue Service; these addresses had
been supplied to us by the CEP. Follow-up postcards were sent on
July 20, 1992, and again on August 31, 1992. Finally, on September
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25, 1992, a letter from the president of the Tax Executives Institute
was sent to the tax officers, expressing support for the compliance cost
project and urging that the questionnaires be filled out and returned.
By the end of the process, 365 completed surveys were received.
To calculate an accurate response rate, it is important to note that many
firms are in the CEP because past years’ tax filings have not been fully
resolved, even though the firms were no longer active entities in 1992,
having either been liquidated or acquired by or merged into another
firm. Considering that, of the 1,672 firms on their mailing list, 1,329
were active entities in 1992, the 365 completed returns represent a
response rate of 27.5%.
HOW REPRESENTATIVE IS THE SAMPLE?
How representative of big business are the 365 companies that
responded to the survey? The answer to this question rests on two
factors: (a) how representative of CEP companies are those that
responded to the survey and (b) how representative of big business are
companies in the CEP program. We next discuss each of these ques-
tions in turn.
To address how representative of the CEP population are the
companies that responded to the survey, we compare the charac-
teristics of the respondent population to the characteristics of the
overall CEP population. The CEP population was described in an April
1992 publication of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) titled
IRS’ Efforts to Improve Corporate Compliance. This report analyzes
the corporate tax returns of all the CEP companies to which the
Statistics of Income Division of the IRS could match a 1988 tax return.
Of the 1,672 companies in the CEP program as of May 1991, there
were 1,329 matches. The predominant explanation for the 343 un-
matched companies was that these companies had, due to takeover or
bankruptcy, ceased to exist as independent entities but had been
retained in the CEP database because past tax years’ cases had not yet
been closed.
The distribution of survey respondents by both principal industry
and size of U.S. assets matches up very closely to the distribution of
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the firms in the GAO study; the principal exception is that only 10.3%
of the survey respondents, compared to 14% in the GAO study, report
U.S. assets over $10 billion.3 Note, however, that there are some
reasons not to expect an exact correspondence. First of all, the GAO
study refers to tax year 1988, whereas the survey was distributed in
1992. Second, the applicable corporate entity is not consistently
measured. The survey responses probably, but not defmitely, apply to
the group of companies-whether consolidated or not for tax purposes
and regardless of the number of corporate entities-for which the
central tax department handles the tax affairs. In contrast, the GAO
study was based on the key single corporation of the corporate group
and thus in general refers to a smaller unit than does the survey. In
some cases the difference will be insignificant; in other cases in which
the corporate structure is divided among several separate significantly
sized corporations, it will refer to a substantially smaller unit than the
survey.
For these reasons, it is impossible to be certain that the respondent
firms are a representative sample of the CEP population. Nevertheless,
the similarity of the industry and asset size distribution make us
reasonably confident that this is in fact the case.4 This leaves open the
question of whether we can generalize about big business as a whole.
The answer to that question depends on how typical of big business
the CEP firms are. Companies are selected for the CEP based on a
number of criteria. First, companies are assigned points based on the
size of their worldwide assets, the size of their worldwide gross
receipts, the number of different significant entities with tax conse-
quences, and the number of different significant separate industries
with tax consequences within the corporate entity. In addition, points
are assigned based on the expected number of staff days of revenue
agents and specialists required for the examination. All companies
whose point total exceeds a certain cutoff are included in the program;
a separate cutoff is assigned to financial corporations and utilities. A
firm not meeting the point criteria may be included in the CEP if &dquo;it
is of sufficient complexity to warrant inclusion and would benefit from
examination using the team examination approach.&dquo;5
Clearly the two dominating criteria for inclusion in the CEP are
sheer size and the expected resource costs of examining the tax return.
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Thus, to the extent that these criteria and compliance costs are corre-
lated, a reasonable expectation is that the active CEP companies have
among the highest compliance costs of any companies operating in
the United States. For that reason, it cannot be assumed that, for any
size grouping, companies in the CEP are typical companies; instead,
they probably have relatively more complex returns and therefore
relatively higher compliance costs. The one possible exception to this
statement is the set of the very largest companies, which are nearly all
in the CEP and are therefore not a subsample of the whole population.
To further investigate the question of exactly what universe the
respondent population represents, we calculated the distribution of the
respondent firms’ rankings, by employment and by sales,6 according
to the Duns Business Rankings (Dunn & Bradstreet Corp. 1992) rank-
ing of the top 5,000 firms in the United States. This information is
presented in Table 1. Note that Duns lists each corporate entity sepa-
rately, so again there is not an exact correspondence between these
rankings and the corporate group referred to in the surveys. In construct-
ing Table 1, the parent company of the corporate group was chosen.
It is clear from Table 1 that the set of responding companies cannot
be considered to be a representative sample of, say, the 1,000 largest
companies in the United States; more than two thirds of the sample do
not make the top 1,000 ranked by either employees or sales. Although
the great majority of responding firms are in the top 5,000 in either
employment or sales, the respondents are not representative of the top
5,000 because they are not evenly distributed throughout the size
categories, there being proportionately more in the larger categories.
The bottom line of our investigation into the generalizability of the
survey population is as follows. We believe that the sample can be
used to make statements about the CEP companies. However, although
large firms dominate the sample, it does not represent the top 500,
1,000, or 5,000 companies in the United States.
To create a sample of firms that is representative of some important
segment of big business, in what follows we analyze both the respon-
dent sample and also a subset of the respondent firms that are in the
1992 Fortune 500, the largest industrial firms in the United States.
There are 98 firms from the Fortune 500 in our sample. Because these
98 firms in the top 500 are clustered toward the top of the Fortune 500
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TABLE 1: Distribution of Survey Respondents’ Dun’s Ranking, by Employment
and Sales
SOURCE: Dun’s Business Rankings (Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 1992).
a. Includes firms too small to make the top 5,000, and three firms for which the lack of
an identification number precluded matching.
b. Also includes financial firms, which were not ranked on the basis of sales by Dun’s.
list, we reweight the sample so that it is representative of all 500. The
reweighting procedure divides the Fortune 500 into groups of 50 and
computes a weighting factor for each of these groups so that in the
reweighted sample each group has equal representation.’ Note that this
procedure does not ensure that each sector is represented in the
reweighted sample in the same proportion as in the Fortune 500.
THE MAGNITUDE AND NATURE
OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS
CAVEATS ABOUT SURVEY-BASED MEASURES OF COMPLIANCE COST
Although our measure of total compliance cost of taxation is a
useful indicator of how complex the corporate tax system is, it is not
ideal. First of all, note that this index does not distinguish on the
taxpayer side between involuntary costs, which must be expended to
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comply with the law, and discretionary costs, which are incurred in an
effort to reduce tax liability; nevertheless, both are costs of operating
the tax system and should be considered in an assessment of how
simply it operates. Nor does it include the cost incurred by the Internal
Revenue Service to administer and enforce the tax system-the ad-
ministrative cost of collection. Finally, this measure refers to the social
rather than the private cost of collection. Because monetary costs of
compliance are deductible, the private cost is less than the social cost.
Because the response rate to the survey was fairly low, a natural
concern is respondent bias. Although in the Fortune 500 sample, the
responses are weighted to reflect observable differences in asset size,
there remain questions about whether the compliance costs of the
nonrespondents within a size group are different from the respondents
because of differing attitudes or behavioral patterns. We cannot correct
for any such bias,8 nor can we assess any biases that arise from the
subjective nature of responses.
THE MAGNITUDE OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS
Table 2 presents the survey results concerning the average cost of
compliance.9 The total cost averages $1.57 million for the survey
respondents as a whole and $2.11 million for the Fortune 500 subsam-
ple. Based on 1,329 active firms in the CEP program, these averages
correspond to a total compliance cost of $2.080 billion for CEP firms
and $1.055 billion for the Fortune 500.10
Table 3 shows how the total costs break down into several catego-
ries. About 55% of the cost goes for within-firm personnel, about 30%
to within-firm nonpersonnel costs, and approximately 15% for outside
assistance. About 70% of the cost is due to the federal tax system, with
the remainder for state and local.&dquo; Of the within-firm costs, about 70%
are incurred within the tax department and 30% in non-tax depart-
ments. These percentages vary slightly, but not significantly, depend-
ing on which sample is used.
One way to put these costs into perspective is to consider them as
a proportion of tax revenue. In the most recent year for which the data
is available, 1989, the CEP firms reported a total federal tax liability





















































































only, for this group is estimated in this study as $1.440 billion ($1.085
million per firm for 1,329 firms). Thus the cost to revenue ratio is
2.6%. To get an estimate of this ratio for all levels of government, we
apply the ratio of total corporate tax revenues to federal corporate tax
revenues for 1989, 1.21, to the $54.4 billion figure, yielding $65.8
billion. The ratio of the estimated total compliance cost of $2.085
billion to $65.8 billion of tax revenue is 3.2%. The ratio for state costs
by themselves is 5.6%; the higher ratio reflects the nonuniformity of
state rules, an issue discussed later in this report.
Table 4 breaks down the total personnel costs by function. For the
tax department, filing returns is the largest category of expense, but it
comprises only slightly above 30% of the personnel costs. Audits,
planning, and research’2 each make up over 10% of the total within-
tax-department personnel cost, with record keeping just under 10%.
However, record keeping is the predominant role of other departments
in the tax process, making up nearly 50% of these personnel costs for
all firms and nearly 40% for Fortune 500 firms. The second most
important role taken on by the nontax departments is preparing infor-
mation for financial statements, comprising about 15% of the total.
Table 5 makes clear that, on average, there is a clear division of
labor between the internal and external tax-related activities. More
than half of litigation and appeals work is done externally; a large
percentage, but less than half, of research, planning, and audit work is
done externally. As is apparent in Table 4, within the firm there is also
a division of labor, with departments outside the tax department
playing a major role only for record keeping and preparing information
for financial statements.
EFFECTS OF SIZE, SECTOR, AND MULTINATIONALITY
On average, large firms experience higher compliance costs. Table
6 breaks firms into six categories based on their total U.S. employment
and shows a generally positive relationship of all categories of com-
pliance cost to firm size, but one in which compliance costs rise less
than proportionately with firm size, so that average costs per unit of
size, are lower for larger firms. This same pattern occurs if size is
measured by assets or sales and whether worldwide rather than U.S.
422
TABLE 4: Within-Firm Personnel Costs by Function (% of total personnel costs)
NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100 because of rounding error.
measures are used as size indicators.’3 Statistical analysis suggests
that, on average, a 10% increase in size is associated with an increase
in compliance costs of between 4.1 % and 6.1 %, depending on which
of the six measures of size is used. 14 The finding of economies of scale
in tax compliance costs is common in studies across countries and
across types of tax.
One must be careful about quantifying the relationship between
compliance cost and sector because of the confounding effect of size.
Simply examining average costs by sector is potentially misleading
because of the differences in average size by sector. Nevertheless, it
is true that, holding size constant, some sectors have higher compli-
ance costs than others. Multiple regression analysis suggests that, even
within size categories, firms in retail or wholesale trade have signifi-
cantly lower than average compliance costs, and firms in oil and gas
or the mining sector have significantly higher than average compli-
ance costs.
One survey question asked what fraction of the compliance cost of
federal taxes was due to the presence of foreign-source income. Based
on these responses, we can estimate the contribution of foreign-source
income to total compliance cost. For all responding firms, the mean













































































































































































mean cost due to federal taxes. The fraction was significantly higher
for the Fortune 500 firms: 45.5%, or $667,000 out of an overall mean
cost of federal taxes of $1,465,700. A more extensive analysis of the
relationship between foreign operations and compliance cost is con-
tained in Blumenthal and Slemrod (1995).~
THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPLIANCE COST
Common sense suggests that firms will experience higher compli-
ance costs as the complexity of the tax code increases and that, at a
point in time, the highest compliance costs will be borne by firms with
the most complex tax situations. To investigate the latter hypothesis,
we must first operationalize the concept of complexity. One charac-
teristic of firms that immediately suggests complexity is size. We
expect the coordination of activities and personnel necessary in large
firms to dominate that of smaller firms, increasing the volume and
scope of record keeping, of communications within and without the
firm, and of planning. On the other hand, there are some significant
fixed costs associated with tax compliance. Examples would include
the purchase and installation of data processing equipment and human
capital investments in learning about and keeping up with the tax code.
Large firms might be expected to benefit, relative to small firms, from
these scale economies .16 A second characteristic that can signal com-
plexity is the firm’s primary industry. The nature of production in some
sectors may require more tax-intensive record keeping or may involve
more sections of the tax code about which there are interpretive
difficulties or controversies. For example, the tax executives advising
this research who work in the oil and gas industry predicted at the
outset that their compliance costs would be relatively high. Another
characteristic, closely related to size, is the breadth of activities a firm
engages in. A corporate tax department filing for two or three active
entities might be expected to have very different compliance costs than
one that files for 40 active entities; a similar argument may be made
if tax liabilities are spread across many states. Yet another charac-
teristic, suggested to us by several tax executives, is whether a firm is
subject to state income taxation in either California or New York. One
426
feature of the tax code that is widely viewed as complex is the
alternative minimum tax (AMT). This suggests that firms subject to
the AMT might then have larger compliance costs. And finally, firms
currently appealing or litigating a tax decision could be seen as having
obviously more complex tax situations and could be expected to
experience higher compliance costs.
Table 7 presents the results of a series of multiple regressions that
seek to explain cross-firm differences in compliance costs. The de-
pendent variable in each equation is the logarithm of personnel expen-
ditures, summed across the tax department and all other departments
within the firm and across expenditures for external tax advice, for
both federal and state/local income taxation. 17 The first three equations
regress the logarithm of compliance costs against alternative measures
of firm size: the logarithm of the number of worldwide employees, of
worldwide assets, and of worldwide sales.18 In each case, the coeffi-
cient on the size variable is significantly greater than 0 and less than
1 in magnitude, confirming earlier empirical findings that although
compliance costs do rise with firm size, they do so less than propor-
tionately. In the fourth equation, size is measured by the logarithm of
worldwide employment and the other complexity indicators are added.
Previous analysis of this data set suggested that compliance costs are
above average in the oil and gas and mining sectors and below average
in wholesale and retail trade. The positive, significant coefficient on
Nat and the negative, significant coefficient on Trade confirm this.
Holding all else constant, firms in the mining or oil and gas sectors are
associated with almost 72% higher compliance costs, whereas those in
wholesale or retail trade are associated with 61 % lower costs, relative
to firms not in these sectors. The coefficient on Active, also statistically
significant, implies that adding one more active entity to a corporation
is associated with raising its compliance costs by 0.52%. Firms that
are subject to the AMT (Altsub) do seem to have significantly higher
compliance costs, on the order of 18% additional expenditures. Com-
plying with the California (CA), but not New York (NY), business
income tax is significantly associated with higher costs, the differential
being about 38% for California. Having an ongoing appeal does not
appear to be significantly associated with costs (Appeals), whereas the
relationship is statistically significant for ongoing litigation (Litgtn):
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TABLE 7: Determinants of Compliance Cost
NOTE: 365-firm unweighted sample. Personnel costs within plus outside firm costs.
Standard errors are in parentheses. logcc = In(within-firm personnel costs plus external
costs); 10gtotE = In(worldwide employment); 10gtotA = In(worldwide assets); 10gtotS =
In(worldwide sales); nat = dummy variable, where 1 if in mining or oil and gas sector, 0
otherwise; trade = dummy variable, where 1 if in wholesale or retail trade, 0 otherwise;
active = number of active entities, in 100s; strets = number of state income tax returns
filed, in 10Os; altsub = dummy variable, where 1 if subject to the AMT, 0 otherwise; CA =
dummy variable, where 1 if firm files in California, 0 otherwise; NY = dummy variable,
where 1 if firm files in New York, 0 otherwise; Appeals = dummy variable, where 1 if firm
currently has tax years before appeals, 0 otherwise; litgtn = dummy variable, where 1
if firm currently has tax years under litigation, 0 otherwise.
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litigating firms appear to have compliance costs that are 27% higher
than nonlitigating firms. In the fifth equation, the number of state
returns (Strets) is substituted in the set of explanatory variables for the
number of active entities, with similar results.
RESPONDENTS’ ATTITUDES
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Part 5 of the survey featured open-ended questions about the causes
of complexity, how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected complexity,
how corporations have coped with increased complexity, and sugges-
tions for reform of the tax law and process.
CAUSES OF COMPLEXITY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
The tax officers were asked what aspect of the current federal tax
code was most responsible for the cost of complying with the tax
system. Of the 365 respondents, 315 gave some response to this
question. More than 75 different aspects were mentioned on at least
one survey. The two aspects most often cited were depreciation (118
mentions) and the AMT (115 mentions). 19 Many of those surveyed tied
the two issues together, citing the cost of having to simultaneously
maintain as many as five separate depreciation accounts for fixed
assets. Many of those that singled out the AMT pointed in particular
to the adjusted current earnings portion of the definition of alternative
minimum taxable income. It is interesting to compare the 115 men-
tions of the AMT to the number of firms that claimed to be currently
subject to the AMT, 167. However, of the companies not currently
subject to AMT, all but 14 of them said they calculated the AMT base
anyway, presumably either to determine their potential AMT liability
or to calculate their Superfund liability. The third most cited source of
complexity was the set of uniform capitalization rules (Section 263A)
introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986; it was listed on 85 surveys.
International tax issues were also widely cited. It is somewhat
problematic to evaluate the breadth of the concern, because many
respondents (44, to be exact) merely mentioned &dquo;international&dquo; or
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&dquo;foreign&dquo; as the aspect causing complexity, without citing a specific
section code. Many others did cite particular code sections, specifi-
cally the foreign tax credit (37), controlled foreign corporations re-
porting on Form 5471 (21), transfer pricing (16), and expense
allocation rules (12); in all, 93 respondents mentioned at least one
foreign-related area. These numbers should be evaluated in light of
the fact that of the 365 respondents, only 253 had some foreign
operations, defined as having either a majority or a minority interest
in a foreign affiliate or having a foreign branch, and only 174 had
foreign employment or assets.
A significant number of respondents replied to this question not by
citing specific code sections but instead by reporting generic problems
with the tax code. The two such problems most often mentioned were
the frequency of changes in the tax law (22 mentions) and the lack of
conformity between book and taxable income (21 mentions).
The survey also asked about what features of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86) most contributed to increasing the complexity of the
tax system. Again, for this question there was a great variety of
answers (over 50). However, for this question a clear-cut favorite
(villain?) emerged-the AMT. Of the 311 firms responding to this
question, 189 mentioned it. The uniform capitalization rules were cited
by 138, and depreciation was cited by 59 (many mentioning the
midquarter convention of the modified accelerated cost recovery
system). Many (29) remarked generally about changes in the foreign
area, with 60 more respondents singling out the foreign tax credit and
11 mentioning the change in the Section 861 allocation rules; in all,
98 companies mentioned one or more foreign-related areas.
There was also a question about what features of TRA86 reduced
complexity. Of the 210 who entered any response, 112 wrote &dquo;none.&dquo;
Adding to this figure the 9 who wrote &dquo;?&dquo; the 5 who wrote &dquo;N/A,&dquo; and
the 8 who wrote either &dquo;hah!&dquo; or &dquo;you must be kidding&dquo; brings the
total to 134 respondents, or 64% of those who wrote anything at all
for this answer, who believe that there were no significant areas of
corporate tax simplification embodied in the 1986 Act. This figure
of 134 does not include the indeterminable number of respondents
whose lack of answer was meant to indicate that there were not any
complexity-reducing aspects to TRA86. Some respondents did,
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though, point to simplification. Thirty-nine cited the elimination of the
investment tax credit, and 10 mentioned the elimination of the prefer-
ential tax treatment of capital gains.
CAUSES OF COMPLEXITY IN STATE AND LOCAL INCOME TAXES
The survey also inquired about the primary causes of complexity
with state and local income taxes. Recall that, on average, the costs of
complying with state and local taxes comprise 30% of total compli-
ance cost.
The most commonly cited source of complexity was the lack of
uniformity among the states, mentioned by 76 of the 269 respondents
who gave some answer to this question. There were 28 mentions of a
particular kind of nonuniformity, that of apportionment formulas, and
34 mentions of the lack of uniformity of depreciation rules.
On 47 surveys, there was a reference to the lack of consistency
between the federal government on the one hand and the states on the
other. Clearly the interstate inconsistency and the federal-state incon-
sistency are two dimensions of having to deal with different tax
jurisdictions, requiring separate procedures to determine tax liability.
After uniformity issues, the next most cited aspect of complexity
was the apportionment formula used to calculate state taxable income.
In addition to the 28 surveys mentioning nonuniform apportionment
formulas, 42 surveys cited this area as a source of complexity. Close
behind was the unitary/water’s edge issue, also cited by 42 respondents.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
One survey question solicited suggestions for simplifying compli-
ance at either the federal or state level. When interpreting these
answers, note that it is arguable that respondents took into considera-
tion the political prospects for effecting particular changes and the
implications (other than simplification) of the tax provisions.
The reform most often suggested was to require more uniformity
between the state corporate income tax systems and the federal system
and between the state systems. Of the 256 surveys that included an
answer to the question, 75 mentioned this type of reform. Nineteen
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respondents went further to recommend an extreme version of federal-
state uniformity-a piggyback system in which the federal govern-
ment defines taxable income, the states specify a tax rate, and the
federal government collects and enforces the law, and remits the
revenues collected to the states according to some formula. Twenty-
seven more responses specified requiring uniformity of the states’
apportionment formulas.
Aside from uniformity, the most popular general suggestion was to
move toward more conformity between taxable income and the meas-
ure of income used for financial accounting purposes. Forty-two
surveys suggested this change. Several tax officers recommended that
the tax calculation begin with book income and then proceed by
making a small number of modifications, a reconciliation similar to
the one now required on Form M-1.
The current tax provision drawing most criticism was the AMT.
Thirty-eight recommended that it be completely eliminated; 11 rec-
ommended only that it be simplified, and 13 more surveys advocated
a particular change-eliminating the adjusted current earnings provi-
sion. Seventeen respondents recommended eliminating the uniform
capitalization rules, with 2 more suggesting that they be simplified;
13 surveys advised that the foreign tax credit provisions be simplified,
and various other international provisions were singled out for simpli-
fication.
Twenty-one respondents suggested that, because the underlying
problem with the tax code was its instability, the required solution was
some kind of moratorium on tax changes, perhaps limiting major tax
bills to once every 3 or 4 years.
PUTTING COMPLIANCE COSTS IN PERSPECTIVE
Any tax system is costly to operate and entails both administrative
and compliance costs. Different systems place different relative bur-
dens on the taxpayer and the tax enforcement agency. They also score
differently on the other important criteria by which we evaluate
taxation-the fairness of the tax burden and how supportive it is of
economic growth. There is often, but not always, a tradeoff that must
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be made between these other goals and simplicity. The simplest tax
system is not necessarily the best, but neither is all of the complexity
in the current system necessarily serving a useful purpose.
It is difficult to dismiss a $1 billion annual compliance cost for the
Fortune 500 alone. These costs represent resources that, under other
circumstances, could have been used to add to the productive capacity
of the country. But are these costs cause for alarm, and do they lead
directly to policy conclusions? To answer these questions, one needs
to put these cost estimates into some kind of perspective. This section
provides some useful perspectives.
OTHER COUNTMES
Although there have been excellent studies of the tax compliance
cost of business done in other countries, none of these studies has
focused on the largest companies, making a meaningful cross-country
comparison impossible. For example, the business sample in the
United Kingdom used by Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989)
contained only two companies with more than 500 employees and only
six with more than 100 employees. In their study of Australia, Pope,
Fayle, and Chen (1991) report having 67 firms with over 1,000
employees and 77 with annual turnover exceeding $100 million. For
the latter group of companies, they estimate annual mean compliance
costs to be A$56,896, compared to mean tax payable of A$1,760,000;
this amounts to 3.2% of tax revenue. Any comparison of these numbers
to the U.S. case should note the much smaller average size of the
Australian sample.
OTHER TAXES
How do the compliance costs per dollar raised through the corporate
income tax compare to other taxes? Earlier work in Slemrod and
Sorum (1984) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) suggests that the
compliance cost of individual income taxes is between 5% and 7% of
revenue raised. This figure is about double what we have tentatively
estimated for income taxes on big business. Note, though, that corpo-
rations also incur some costs in administering the individual income
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tax, via withholding; these costs have not been included in any of the
studies. Note also that, because of the clear economics of scale in tax
compliance, the cost-to-revenue ratio for the corporate income tax is
undoubtedly higher for corporations that are smaller than the group
studied in this project. Thus the cost-to-revenue ratio for the corporate
sector as a whole, or the business sector as a whole, is undoubtedly
higher than what is calculated in this study.
PREVIOUS YEARS’ COMPLIANCE COSTS
Arlinghaus and Anderson (1986) report on the results of two mail
surveys on compliance costs sent to all Fortune 500 firms, one con-
ducted in 1983 and the other in late 1985 and early 1986. Their
response rates were 46.2% and 46.4%, respectively.
Table 8 presents their results in comparison with those of this work.
For several reasons, however, these studies are not strictly compara-
ble. First, Arlinghaus and Anderson define tax personnel as managers,
supervisors, and technical specialists employed to do tax work for the
corporation at corporate headquarters. Secretarial and data processing
employees are explicitly excluded. In contrast, the current study
includes not only clerks and data processors but employees who do
tax work outside the corporate headquarters. Second, Arlinghaus and
Anderson lump franchise, property, sales, and use tax compliance with
income tax work at the state and local levels. The current study is
devoted to compliance with the taxation of income only. Third, the
categories of nonpersonnel compliance expenditures differ, notably in
the exclusion of computers and data processing and record storage and
retrieval by Arlinghaus and Anderson. Finally, Arlinghaus and Anderson
did not reweight their data to correct for any potential systematic bias
in which firms responded to the survey.
Even with these caveats in mind, a comparison of the Arlinghaus-
Anderson 1986 figures with the 1992 numbers from this study is
instructive. First, note that the comparison should be made in infla-
tion-adjusted dollars and that the Consumer Price Index rose by 28.0%
between 1986 and 1992. Using this adjustment factor, the average
within-firm cost rose slightly, although the personnel component of
the cost actually declined. Most striking is the 86% increase in the real
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TABLE 8: Comparison of Arlinghaus-Anderson Mean Compliance Costs Re-
sults for 1983 and 1986 to the Results of This Report (Fortune 500
only)
NOTE: All figures are in thousands of dollars.
expenditure on outside tax advisors. This apparent surge in the use of
outside assistance is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that only
11 % of responding firms mentioned that since 1986 they made use of
more outside consulting to cope with the increased complexity of the
tax process.
The Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1988) study of business compliance
costs, commissioned by the IRS, estimated a total annual burden in
1985 of 3.614 billion hours but did not convert that into a dollar figure.
However, their sample of 1,090 corporations included only one with
assets in excess of $250 million, and only nine with assets over $10
million; for that reason, it does not provide a reliable measure of the
tax compliance costs of big business.
THE COMPLIANCE COST OF FEASIBLE TAX ALTERNATIVES
The most meaningful perspective on compliance costs is how they
stack up against what they would be under feasible alternative tax
regimes. That, alas, is the most difficult kind of question to answer
quantitatively. For example, although this survey can help to estimate
the incremental compliance cost burden of foreign operations, it
cannot reliably estimate the cost saving from an incremental simplifi-
cation of, say, the foreign tax credit system. Nor can it estimate the
cost saving of altering the AMT to eliminate the adjusted current
earnings provision.
This, however, is the kind of information that would be most helpful
to add to the policy debates about tax changes. In theory, a survey that
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was focused on the potential cost savings of a set of concrete policy
proposals could provide reasonable estimates of this figure. At a
minimum, any evaluation of a tax policy alternative should include an
estimate of whether it would increase, reduce, or leave unchanged the
cost of compliance and administration.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has established that the cost to big business of complying
with the income tax system is, in an absolute sense, large--over $1 I
billion for the Fortune 500 companies and over $2 billion for a group
of 1,329 large companies that warrant special examination by the IRS.
These compliance costs, which are ultimately borne by the customers,
workers, and shareholders of the corporation, dwarf the budget cost
of administering the income tax systems.
As a fraction of revenues raised, these compliance costs are lower
than estimates that have been made for the individual income tax. This
is not very surprising, as it is well established, and demonstrated by
this survey, that there are significant economies of scale in tax collec-
tion, so that collecting revenue from large enterprises is relatively
efficient. Because of these economies of scale, it is not appropriate to
conclude that similar cost-to-revenue ratios would apply to the corpo-
rate tax system as a whole and not just the largest corporations; such
ratios would certainly be much higher. The cost-to-revenue ratio is
higher for state corporate tax systems than it is for the federal tax
system, presumably reflecting the nonuniformity of state tax systems.
There is near unanimity among senior corporate tax officers that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 added complexity to the tax system,
resulting in a combination of higher compliance costs and less accurate
information transmission. They point to, in particular, the AMT,
inventory capitalization rules, and foreign income rules as growing
sources of complexity; the California state corporate tax system is
apparently a large source of compliance cost in itself. One striking
finding is that the corporate officers point to greater uniformity among
the states’ income tax systems and greater conformity of state to
federal rules as the most promising simplification that could be made;
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reforming or eliminating the AMT was also high on many lists of
recommended simplifications. Although complexity has increased,
tax department budgets have not kept pace. Corporations have re-
sponded by computerizing their operations. There has also apparently
been a large increase since 1986 in expenditures on outside tax
assistance. Many respondents, though, are concerned that increased
complexity in the face of limited budgets leads to a lower quality of
information being transmitted to the IRS.
What this survey has not, and could not, establish is whether any
particular tax simplification is a good idea. That is because simplicity
is but one criterion of many against which the tax system ought to be
evaluated. But simplicity has been an oft-overlooked criterion, and
quantitative estimates of the cost of overlooking it are a first step
toward keeping it in the forefront of policy debates.
NOTES
1. The survey and cover letter are contained in Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993).
2. The rules for including firms in the Coordinated Examination Program are discussed in
the following section.
3. Another apparent discrepancy is that the survey contains a lower percentage of firms in
the retail sector, 1.9% compared to 7% in the General Accounting Office (GAO) study. However,
this discrepancy is probably explained by the fact that, due to an oversight, the survey did not
list "Retail" as one of the sectors to be checked. Those firms that did list their principal sector
as retail did so by writing it as a separate category. Note that the fraction of firms describing their
primary business as retail or services, a likely alternative categorization for a retail business, was
10.4%, compared to 12% in the GAO study.
4. Even if the asset and industry distributions of the responding companies are repre-
sentative of large companies, it is still possible that those that do respond are unrepresentative
if, for example, firms with especially costly tax departments are more likely to respond; this
would bias the compliance cost estimates upward. See the later section on "Caveats about
Survey-Based Measures of Compliance Cost."
5. Internal Revenue Manual (May 10, 1989), p. 4200-78.
6. The distribution by sales is for nonfinancial firms only.
7. The weights are as follows: Rank 1-50,0.576; 51-100, 1.089; 101-150,0.980; 151-200,
0.754; 201-250, 0.817; 251-300, 0.817; 301-350, 0.817; 351-400, 1.960; 401-450, 4.900;
451-500, 1.633.
8. In the context of mail surveys of individuals’ income tax compliance costs, Tait (1988)
has argued that respondent bias will cause an overstatement of true costs because respondents
are more likely to be those who consider tax compliance to be a "vexatious cost," (p. 352) and
because those respondents will try to influence the perception of high costs to generate policy
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response to lower them. Sandford (1995) offers a counterargument to this view, observing that
taxpayers who have vexatious compliance costs are likely to be those who dislike filling in forms
and will therefore dislike completing complicated questionnaires about compliance costs. For
large corporations, this latter argument is probably not material.
9. Data preparation issues are discussed in more detail in Appendix B to Slemrod and
Blumenthal (1993). The most problematic issue is the treatment of missing values in the survey.
The appendix discusses how an extreme alternative treatment could lower the estimate of cost
by as much as 16%.
10. Note that, because not all Fortune 500 firms are in the CEP, the $1.055 billion is not a
component of the $2.080 billion figure.
11. What fraction of costs is incurred because of federal taxes, as opposed to state and local
taxes, is undoubtedly highly arbitrary for many firms.
12. Research compnses 9.0% of personnel costs within the tax department for Fortune 500
firms.
13. The analogous tables for assets and sales can be found in Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993).
14. These estimates are based on regression analyses of the logarithm of compliance cost,
excluding nonpersonnel costs, as a function of the loganthm of each of the six size measures
The details of the regression results are presented in the first three columns of Table 7.
15. There are small differences in the average compliance cost estimates reported in Tables 2,
5, and 6. These are due to methodological differences in the construction of the tables. For
example, within-firm personnel expenditures are not broken down by function in Table 2,
whereas they are in Table 5; within-firm, nonpersonnel expenditures are allocated between
federal and state compliance costs in Table 2 but not in Table 6. The estimates differ slightly
across tables both because some respondents did not give sufficient information to break down
their expenditures (missing values) and because of rounding errors.
16. There is empirical support for this proposition in the literature. See Pope, Fayle, and Chen
(1991) and Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989).
17. Nonpersonnel, within-firm compliance costs were excluded from this analysis to avoid
a substantial reduction in sample size, necessitated by the number of missing values for these
variables.
18. Financial and insurance firms were excluded from the sample in the second and third
equations because the meanings of both sales and assets are so different for them as compared
with firms in any other sector.
19. Many respondents listed more than one aspect of the tax code, so that the total number
of aspects mentioned exceeds the number of surveys for which an answer to this question was
given.
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